May 17

You don’t need to be a tabloid nowadays to err on the populist or sensationalist sides when writing about the “Eurozone umbrella plan”. I do understand that the deep structural problems some Eurozone countries currently face call for a more critical writing style. However, some parallels drawn in popular media in regard of the falling Euro exchange rate are simply technically wrong.

It should be obvious by now that both many of the foreseen measures in the umbrella plan, as well as the current monetary policy and actions of the ECB lead in fact to devaluation effects (i.e. due to longer term low-interest rate prospects on the one side, and ECB measures such as additional financing facilities on the other side). Thus, saying that the Eurozone “bailout package” did not help “stabilize” the EUR/USD exchange rate is not correct. If anything, the umbrella plan not only did help (or so we hope) buy more time for EU-member states with deficit issues to deal with their fiscal and structural problems, it also brought about a devaluation that is more likely to help, rather than harm the EU economy in my view. A weaker Euro will enable Germany to achieve even stronger short-term growth, given the distinctive export nature of its economy. Smaller side effects may include a boost in inbound and inward tourism, especially helpful namely for the southern European countries in need. I would not go that far to call it a breath of fresh air, but a devaluation of the Euro was somewhat due, taking into account over-performance against the US dollar in the recent years.

It is however still noteworthy to mention that, seen as a whole entity, the European economy (including the other EU currencies) is pretty much self-sufficient. Exports and imports each have less than 20% share of the combined GDP. Hence, generally a slight Euro devaluation should not have major effects on both the inflationary and the export sides in the monetary union. Indeed, looking at the EU as a whole, many of the challenges countries such as Greece, Portugal or even Spain now present politically to the Eurozone are somewhat balanced out, had the EU been a single country. After all, structural differences aside, California’s state deficit is (as a problem per se) not much different than Greece’s (meaning governments over-borrowed for many years) but the resulting rhetoric is very different — a EU-member country is (not yet) a US member-state.

Well, that’s enough for far-fetched remarks. We shall see how the markets react to new government debt issues from the PIIGS countries in the coming months. My personal opinion — that ought to be enough to secure reasonable borrowing rates from the markets.

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May 14

I am happy to be reporting again, here on my blog after a long 4-month break prompted largely by my MBA studies. My first post in a while will neither discuss the Eurozone bailout plans or the elections in the UK; nor the underperformance of the European economy or the Q1 overperformance many blue-chip companies out there pulled out.

Rather, I’d first like to share with you an update with some photos from my 10-day motorcycle trip from Vienna to the mediterrainean islands of Corsica and Sardinia. I have included some tips for fellow riders who are likely to google this page when planning their own trips. :)
Click here or scroll down to the photos!


Big Trip Map


Corsica and Sardinia

Anyway, during the most turbolent ride I’ve done so far, I managed to get from Vienna to Livorno at 01:30am after 17 hours of travelling. It wasn’t boring as I was confronted with a neat combination of sun, a little bit of snow and lots of heavy rainshowers and strong crosswinds. I was then unlucky to encounter thick fog as soon as it got dark somewhere before Bologna, Italy. Cold and soaking wet, it was also a bit scary to get stuck for 30mins in a two-lane tunnel in between Bologna and Florence due to an accident that had happened some 20 cars ahead in the tunnel. I carried three layers of “waterproof” gloves that needed thorough hand-drying at each an every gas station I stopped at.

After joining my friends who had arrived comfortably the previous day from Bulgaria, I slept for good 4 hours before getting on the ferry to Bastia, Corsica. We had pre-ordered tickets for the 6 motorbikes and the Ford Transit van that followed us carrying our luggage. The bikes were, starting from the smallest bike (mine) 2009 Suzuki Gladius 650, 2009 Kawasaki VN900 Custom, 2010 Kawasaki Z1000, 2009 Kawasaki ZX-10R, 2005 Yamaha MT-01 and the mighty 2010 Yamaha V-max.

Upon reaching Bastia we only had 2h for the 150km transfer farther down south to the other ferry from Bonifaccio, Corsica to Santa Teresa, Sardinia. After getting literally ripped off for the last-minute short hop of 12km between the two islands we choose to stay at Porto Cervo (one of Italy’s most exclusive resorts), some 40 km from Santa Teresa. Showing up unannounced off-season, you can sometimes get the wildest bargains — as we ended up paying only 30% of the room price at the empty Sheraton Porto Cervo. By the next day the weather had finally cleared and even manageed to stay so for the remainder of the trip! We had GPS-preloaded waypoints for a very enjoyable ride to the southern-most end of Sardinia. For anyone out there who is currently googling for Sardinia routes — the SS125 from Dorgali to Baunei is a must visit — impeccable asphalt, high elevation, tunnels, lots of turns and little traffic.

Some lessons learned — never travel all day long without having lunch; always set up the van driver’s GPS with the daily waypoints in the morning so that he doesn’t get lost. We ended up staying in Quartu Santa Elena, a small town close to Sardinia’s capital Cagliari. That neighborhood seemed like the exact opposite of Porto Cervo; it bore close resemblance to a town you’d expect to see in Africa (some 250km south). We ate at a restaurant where the local soccer team (Cagliari) were celebrating very loudly a match they’ve just won and the waiter kept apologizing on their behalf multiple times. Needless to say, the food and the service were top-notch (Italy at its best).

Proceeding northwards the following day we encountered biker’s paradise — SS49 and SS105 that run parallel to the coastline and lead to the town of Alghero; highly recommended. The road had very little traffic , except for a local biker who missed a turn and had an accident right in front of us on SS105. We immediately stepped in to help get his bike out of the bushes and fixed it in 2nd gear; luckily he too was alright. He did make a mistake though, by jumping up as soon as he fell down. As a friend says, “every time I fall, I always remain laying on the ground. I think about where it hurts; or I think where it doesn’t hurt”. We had the best ice-cream in Alghero then rode farther north towards Porto Torres and even managed to split the group in two by getting lost. We stayed for the night in Castelsardo, 20km east from Porto Torres. An interesting thing in Sardinia were the self-service gas stations that were pretty much the only gas stations available. Best is to have 5 € bills in advance and beware the 3 min fill-in deadline.

Landing in Corsica on the next day, we rode from Bonifaccio to Ajaccio. Any route you take to get there is likely to be great, so you really can’t go wrong. Sardinia is beautiful, but Corsica’s beauty is just mind-boggling. We stayed over in Ajaccio (a block away from where Napoleon was born) and then proceeded towards the mountains via D81, D70, D170, D84 then D81 and D81b all the way up to Calvi. The mountain terrain in the vicinity of the villages of Evisa and Marignana (D70, D84) left us speechless. And it is best to come across such riding pleasure through serendipity. Very tight turns and breathtaking views of the settlements, built who knows how (and why) on nearly vertical slopes. We saw lots of livestock literally roaming free on those country roads — the famous “bio” Corsican pig being very popular over there. Continuing northwards, a piece of advice — do not take the seaside D81b, take D81 instead. D81b had 15-20km of the most dreadful road conditions I have ever seen (choppy pot-hole asphalt covered in sand). Upon reaching Saint Florent we turned northwards to go around Cap Corse. We left our van to drive directly to Bastia, because the GPS said the road around Cap Corse’s coastline had sections too tight for the van. And they were tight, alright. Riding this surreal stretch of largely unsafe roads at sunset was truly amazing! However, you do need an enduro, preferably a smaller one, to really feel good there. Both the Yamaha V-max as well as the supersport Kawasaki ZX-10R were really challenged by the constant tight turns and low gears needed. My 650cc Suzuki Gladius was alright given it was lighter and has a relatively upright seating position. That day we clocked over 13 hours of riding and by the time we finally got to Bastia it was already dark.

After getting last-minute ferry tickets (“Corsica Ferries”) from Bastia to Livorno and getting ripped off again I can only recommend anyone to buy their tickets well in advance (at least we could have saved over 200 €, had we done that). Upon arrival in Italy we visited the leaning tower of Pisa, a short 18km ride from Livorno. From there on my friends took off to Bulgaria and I rode to Florence to board the train to Vienna the next day (together with my bike). Overall, it was an immensely enjoyable trip; the weather was great and everyone had lots of fun. And Corsica is a place I definitely intend to visit again, with or without a motorcycle.

Comments and questions are very welcome. Click on any of the 50 photos below to view a larger rendition.
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Jan 26

It was a great pleasure to attend and be part of the discussion with H.E. William C. Eacho, III held at Webster University Vienna this evening.

Just over a year ago former U.S. ambasador David Girard-diCarlo gave a similarly eloquent speech, albeit then scripted and prepared for a much bigger audience at the Vienna University of Economics and Business. It’s now quite intriguing for me to compare the opinions and worldviews of the two U.S. diplomats — a republican and a democrat. One was a major contributor to the campaigns of Bush and McCain and the other — one of Obama’s biggest fundraisers.

The overall atmosphere of the two ambassador talks does however mark a stark contrast. I can easily recall the gloomy, pessimistic sentiment of November 2008 — Lehman had just collapsed, AIG was bailed out hastily and GM’s executives were having a hard time convincing the U.S. government to rescue them out as well. Global credit markets had frozen almost altogether and Girard-diCarlo made then the remark that had they not saved AIG, most big European banks would have failed within 12-24 hours. This talk was held immediately after Obama got elected; nonetheless the international image of the U.S. was then still at an all-time bottom low. Although Obama’s motto for change was “yes we can”, at that time as a non-american I was convinced that change was not just optional: “no, you must”.

Fast forward to January 2010, worst case scenarios for severe global unemployment, extreme euro-dollar volatility and a second Great Depression have fortunately turned out wrong. It can be argued as to whether only the coordinated government efforts were to blame for restoring confidence and reopening the credit markets, yet the fact remains that all could have gone much worse. In times like these even the monetarists turn Keynesian. Thus, I can’t help but agree with most of the points that Ambassador Eacho made, this time as an U.S. ambassador with a palpable and visible degree of sincere optimism. Appraising the first year of Obama’s administration, here are some of the points that were made during the discussion, the way I understood them:

– the U.S. brand is back again and U.S. goods and exports in general will regain some of the image loss they had suffered during the last two republican presidential terms. Of course, I expect that to be more tangible in some of the clearly less U.S.-friendly parts of the world.

– the importance of free trade and the reassuring confirmation that if markets are kept open and protectionism is restrained from, the global economy will be along the path of natural recovery in no time.

– fiscal discipline is paramount and the bail outs of AIG, GM, etc. were one time exceptions to prevent bigger failure. A good example was given with the first bail out of Chrysler (in 1980 by U.S. president Jimmy Carter), whereby the company had its management changed (with Lee Iacoca as CEO) and in 3 years every cent was repaid. I understand that although clear GM mismanagement (both poor industrial relations management as well as an obsolete product line) had indeed brought the company down, stepping in by the U.S. government was fully justified and failing to do so would have resulted in enormous welfare payments costs as well as bankruptcy spillovers in related industries.

– the U.S. foreign policy format has changed from one of purely unilateral decisions to a cooperative, partner’s opinion seeking approach. The now changed perceived image of the U.S. in Europe is a clear indication of that. And as the ambassador emphasized, the success of the G20 summit proved to be a turning point in the financial crisis. In addition, a bi-partisan approach to deal with the major issues at hand is about to be undertaken in the U.S. as well (after the recent republican win).

– liberal democracy as the universal principle for worldwide politics — yes, but not at any cost and not without the proper institutions in place first. Simply allowing people to vote then calling that a democracy is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for establishing a modern civilized state. The supremacy of law, protection of property rights and in essence strong government institutions are a basic prerequisite for democracy.

– among all ongoing discussions on the change in the U.S. medical care system, the biggest argument is actually the better cost effectiveness, notwithstanding a system where the government has a bigger involvement. This is actually quite illogical at first, however the data shows that the U.S. medical spending is about 15-16% of GDP, Austria’s on the other hand (which has excellent medical care) is around 10-11% and other highly industrialized European countries are even at 8-9% of GDP for heath care. In addition, better labor mobility and preservation of demographics for certain states, given the presence of universal health care, is an argument that can even get the votes of some republican senators for enacting the universal health care legislation.

It was also great to be able to chat about the imminent regulatory changes in the banking sector and whether or not the U.S. will again resort to historic policies of splitting universal banks in commerical and investment banks (as was done in the 1930s). Ambassador Eacho shared my view that the rating agencies should be reformed and that they have too much power on their hands now. Something that has been left apparently overlooked during the first year of Obama’s administration due to other things being more urgent. I do however agree that Europe has to take its share in such reforms as well; not only in talks with the big three rating agenies, but also more importantly by agreeing on international accounting standards (especially for the banking industry). That way capital ratios, balance sheet data, etc. could be better cross-evaluated and compared between European and U.S. banks.

All in all, it was a great event and I would like to thank Webster University Vienna and H.E. Ambassador Eacho for the opportunity to discuss these issues.

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Jan 16

I just can’t not comment on is the very unconvincing, thoroughly shameful hearing of Bulgaria’s EU commissioner designate R. Jeleva (here’s a link to the full hearing).

Right now it’s on the front pages of blogs, newspapers and media all over Europe. The Economist, European Voice, just to name a few. I will abstract from details, but Jeleva was basically attacked on two fronts – her non-compliance with the EU conflict of interest regulations regarding non-affiliation with private businesses as a MEP from 2007-2009 and her lack of familiarity and inability to convince the EP of any deep knowledge of the assigned portfolio – humanitarian aid. Even given the current situation in Haiti alone, it is most definitely not an insignificant portfolio.

Rumiana Jeleva’s lack of preparation for this hearing was a disgraceful display of the same poor leadership qualities that lead to the withdrawal of EU funds from Bulgaria’s previous socialist government: arrogance, disregard for European practices, disregard for transparency, lack of honesty and accountability. Jeleva should have prepared better, no matter how certain that EU commissioner post may have seemed to her.

Following the hearing, prime minister Borisov, not much unsurprisingly, did two poor moves. Firstly, he claimed “he had spoken to the right people to convince them our candidate was good”. Guess what? Everyone saw her poor performance, “calling people” in the same old crony capitalistic, police manner it is done in the Balkans will not cut it; Europe is more or less democratic now and things work differently. In fact, I am proud to be a European; this is a clear case, actually a monumental case for the enacting the Lisbon treaty, whereby the interests of the Union prevail against the interests of a single country. Secondly, in an attempt to cover up the fact that Jeleva acted against the law by not declaring an active participation in her consultancy firm, the deputy minister of justice Lyudmila Petrova issued a legal opinion that Jeleva may have made a breach of a seemingly insignificant regulation, but not an actual violation of the Bulgarian law. (New Europe has the original and translated documents). Notwithstanding, Jeleva did in effect mislead the EP in stating that she did not have commercial conflicts of interest after 2007.

It is indeed a major disaster on Bulgaria’s government part and also a tough hit on the EPP as well. We’ll have to wait a bit to see how things play out. The EPP is now probably mad at GERB and the Bulgarians for not doing their homework. But my guess is, eventually prime minister Boyko Borisov will appoint another candidate (the much better qualified and eloquent current defence minister Mladenov). The costs of plowing through and keeping Jeleva will be too much to bear for the EPP and for Bulgaria.


In addition, I’d also like to post a link to a petition to stop software patents in Europe that is currently gaining momentum.

The petition is aimed at promoting innovation in software. Copyright protection should be ensured whilst also removing the widely misused software patents that are still in many cases accepted in European court decisions. The petition lists a number of funny “methods” of doing things online that seem to be actually patented — e.g. paying with a credit card, video streaming, web shops, shopping carts, getting a key via SMS, etc.

I’m not a big supporter of signing random online petitions, but it is worth taking 2 mins and signing this one.

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Jan 16

Welcome to the first post in 2010! After having my blog (WordPress 2.8) hacked, I am happy to be reporting online again. I feel sorry for the poor soul that took the time to bring this website down for a couple of days, yet nevertheless I feel somewhat honored by the attention that I am receiving.

I would first like to comment on a Wall Street Journal article from Jan, 12th. I hold the concerns of Bulgaria’s prime minister Boyko Borisov that public debt surges in Greece (and to a lesser extent elsewhere in Old Europe) would have repercussions for Bulgaria’s euro-zone for very well grounded. The realistic achievement of a balanced budget in 2010 would be a huge success amidst a pile-up of political and public policy disappointments of the government led by Borisov. This success alone may however not suffice for a euro-zone membership. I am a big proponent of an early euro-zone entry, but still, the overall costs of integrating Bulgaria at this time may be higher than expected. The EU/ECB will have to carefully sort out whether the benefits for the added stability in Bulgaria would outweight midterm costs and lead to stability loss for the euro-zone as a whole.

Below I am posting an excerpt from a seminar paper that I wrote as an undergraduate which dealt with Bulgaria’s currency board on the way to the euro-zone:


Mundell (1961) et al formulated labor mobility, the degree of openness and economy diversification as the basic requirements for participation in a single currency area. [..] According to his analysis single currency areas rely on similar levels of price stability where a single monetary policy would theoretically suffice for all. His work had helped lead to the creation of the Euro, which according to him is “a great step forward” and “a catalyst for international monetary reform”. However, some of the requirements for a single currency area to work (such as the common U.S. Dollar for all 50 states) that Mundell has postulated such as labor mobility and indirectly language barriers and housing markets flexibility do not yet fully apply for the newest EU-members such as Bulgaria. Hence, even in basic theory, notwithstanding all common sense reasons and the positive public opinion to join the EMU, some contra-arguments exist in regard of the ability of the newly joined the EU “immature” Bulgarian economy to fight asymmetric shocks. Still, there is an overwhelming amount of positive effects that make the adopting of the single European currency unambiguously attractive, especially in a credit crisis with inherent refinancing problems.

Summarized in theory, benefits of euro-zone integration include the elimination of exchange transaction costs and exchange rate volatility, removal of payment obstacles to trade, prevention of competitive devaluation and speculation, prevention of extremely high interest rates that hinder economic growth when countering a currency speculation attack. [..]

I remember that in April 2009 the Financial Times quoted a non-disclosed IMF report, urging for unilateral euroization because “to countries in the EU, euroization offers the largest benefits in terms of resolving the foreign currency debt overhang, removing uncertainty and restoring confidence”. This assessment certainly still holds true and I hope that the severe public spending slashes actually do help put Bulgaria in ERMII soon enough.

Talking about spending cuts, I fully support Simeon Djankov’s actions for many reasons. Bulgaria’s economy has to be painfully restructured to rely much less on government spending — government projects, orders and the like. Apart from infrastructure projects the government should not be the main contractor and provider of business that companies are on the lookout for. And yes, taxes are low but I can’t help but quote Milton Friedman here that “if you receive more revenue by cutting taxes, you aren’t cutting taxes enough”. Thus, if Djankov is cutting spending while keeping taxes low — well, he can’t do much wrong. The whole polemic of an ultra large intra-company indebtedness that circulates in the media in Bulgaria is in my opinion overrated and things will eventually settle back to normal.

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Dec 09

Emil A. Georgiev wrote a comment in my blog that I think entails a new post in reponse. He said:

I believe the Emirates will make it, but what do you think about Greece – a member of the Eurozone?

Yes, Greece’s budget deficit, rating downgrades and potential problems with their sovereign debt rollover are somewhat alarming. The problem is not that they do not have the money to repay that debt (of course they don’t) — the problem is that they are supposed to refinance themselves from the market. And as the market lends only to prudent borrowers, at a 12,6% deficit Greece may not be considered an eligible one.

Yet when it comes to a Western European, Eurozone country make no mistake — that debt will be underwritten no matter what. On the one hand, the effects of a potential Eurozone sovereign default will definitely be Lehman-like, i.e. the systemic relevance of that sovereign default is paramount. On the other hand, the surplus liquidity that the ECB seems to be slowly and deliberately retracting (e.g. their announcements on the ‘enhanced credit measures’ from last week) can and will be channeled elsewhere when needed. They do not even have to go great lengths to inflate away that debt.

In the end of the day, no one will allow a small and highly leveraged country of such systemic relevance to go under. Not only Greek’s government, but also the whole Euro currency union is only as good as its credibility. The rating agencies’ response and ultimately the higher cost of borrowing will have to be sadly borne by the whole Greek nation. Putting a higher price tag on future borrowing for the whole Greek economy out of rating/market necessity will act more disciplinary than any legal constraints Brussels might impose on Greece. After all, if they had been following the Eurozone 3% GDP deficit guidline figures, they wouldn’t be in the mess they are today. I do expect though that there will be significant pressure on Greece to cut its public spending, should the EU/ECB really step in to bail out the Hellenic Republic of Greece.

By the way, what this also re-translates to is that Bulgaria’s aspirations to ERM II could be put to a halt for the forseeable future. Joining the EU once is a good deed, but entering the monetary union now might actually go far beyond the official Maastricht criteria. Thus, even if we consider that in a semi-deflationary environment Bulgaria meets all three criteria with a balanced budget (close but under the 3% mark), low inflation (to be in the top 3 lowest EU-wide if I recall correctly; seems somewhat achievable now) and low public debt (Bulgaria’s is way below the maximum of 60% of GDP required), Bulgaria might still not make it to the Eurozone out of political and country risk reasons. Even without the infrastructure and social expenditures of Greece.

In a nutshell, Greece will not default. As the saying goes, if you do not repay a € 1.000,- debt you have a problem; if you do not replay a € 10 million debt, the bank has a problem. In this case this bank is the ECB and the responsible account manager is the EU. They will surely get a hold of the situation, yet the “little Dubai” effect and the bad aftertaste of a popped property price bubble will continue to linger not only on Bulgaria and Greece, but also on any country that leveraged itself mostly through property sales, rather than industrial output in the recent years (such as Spain).

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Dec 02

Ok here’s some good news. Yesterday Standard & Poor’s confirmed Bulgaria’s BBB foreign currency long term debt rating but upgraded its outlook to stable.

The measures taken by the government to cut expenses and increase revenues as well as next year’s budget were taken into account for the revision of the rating outlook. The government plans a budget deficit of 0,7% but many analysts seem to conclude that a deficit of 1,2-1,3% for 2010 is more realistic.

Parallel to the rating revisions, it’s interesting to follow the CDS on Buglaria’s sovereign debt. I just looked it up in my Bloomberg terminal at work and made a chart:

For anyone interested, below are the FC/LT debt ratings that S&P has assigned to the Republic of Bulgaria since 1998 (source: Bloomberg):

Rating Watch Date Effective
BBB 10/30/2008
BBB+ *- 10/23/2008
BBB+   10/26/2006
BBB   10/27/2005
BBB-   6/24/2004
BB+   5/22/2003
BB   10/ 7/2002
BB-   11/ 7/2001
B+   5/10/2000
B   11/23/1998
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Dec 02

After last week’s standstill — note to self: try to write at least one post per week. So here are 3 interesting topics that caught my attention last week. Hmm, that actually ain’t a bad idea — if nothing special comes up, I will try to write a weekly update on something plus “The BG Story”. The BG Story will come as an additional bonus for all my fellow Bulgarian friends that have started following my blog. Alright, here goes.

Dubai: will we see a double-dip fincancial crisis due to Dubai’s debt issues?

A valid question I suppose raised by many immediately after last week’s debt moratorium on Dubai World’s debt in regard to its subsidiary Nakheel. Nakheel is Dubai government’s real estate development vehicle that bravely invested in outrageously lavish projects such as the Palm Islands (a showcase of unnecessary land reclamation) and the Nakheel Tower — the would-be world’s tallest skyscraper, whose construction was already put on hold in January this year.

All in all, the proposed extension of maturity of the US-$ 59 billion worth of debt until May 2010 triggered luckily no massive, Lehman-II-style global sell off. I’d venture to guess a couple of reasons for that:

  • First and foremost, everyone should have been aware by now that Dubai’s construction boom and property bubble have come to a halt and a much needed reality check was due. The imminent correction due — decline of buyers and inevitable tightening of cashflow — is anything but a surprise for anyone invested in those real estate projects.
  • $59 billion is peanuts compared to the thousands of billions of real estate debt that the collective American household had accumulated for many years before the credit crunch eventually struck
  • The banks and Sovereign Wealth Funds of the Emirates should have enough cash on their hands (some sources quote a total for Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi of US-$ 1200 billion) to provide support for Dubai’s debt
  • Although Dubai’s government initial reaction was somewhat surprising, I think they did the right thing by not announcing that Nakheel’s debt will be underwritten right away. Why? Because, although later on Abu Dhabi’s central bank confirmed it would step up to help, they are setting a good example for prudent behavior to prevent future build up of bail-out candidates.

After reading a couple of articles I understand why analysts seem to conclude that Dubai’s debt issues will continue to cast a grim shadow on global markets until the end of the year and maybe beyond. However, in the end of the day I don’t think that will trigger anything Lehman-like.

Der Standard: Eastern Europe to see the slowest economic growth

Not surprisingly the press in Austria follows eagerly anything CEE/SEE related. In the past two weeks two alarming articles came up in Der Standard. EBRD’s chief economist Erik Berglöf estimated that the region will underperform significantly compared to the rest of the world in terms of economic growth.

In yet another Der Standard article Roland Berger’s CEE expert Vladimir Preveden holds that Eastern Europe will lose popularity as an economic destination. Some countries such as Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovenia and Slovakia  are likely to develop very differently “post-crisis” than region peers such as Hungary, Bulgaria or Romania. Structural reforms in those countries can only be brought about by either continious pressure from Brussels or by the IMF. Latvia’s standby agreement comes to mind.

In sum those countires are now at a sustainable strategic disadvantage. As Preveden points out, they also have very serious issues to deal with — accelerated ageing of the population together with steady brain drain and westward immigration.

The different, i.e. lower industrial profile of those countries renders them very dependent on foreign investments. Now, even though these are all risks that foreign investors were even pre-crisis well aware of, their “worst-case” scenario has certainly happened. The imbalances that were built after years of unsustainable growth, overinvestment in dubious short-term projects and relative underinvestment in local industrial development will continue to put pressure and dampen growth even after Western Europe recovers and beyond. Contrary to some SEE analyses that I read earlier this year, the common opinion now seems to be that SEE will not lead, but lag in terms of rebound growth.

The BG Story: FIBank downgraded by Moody’s, stops cooperation with them

Here’s an interesting official blog post in Capital.bg. FIBank’s response to being downgraded by Moody’s struck me as very “typical”, although breaking up with the agency might make good sense in their situation on cost grounds alone. I strongly agree with the way the blog article was written and I was not surprised at all by the way FIBank’s Marketing/PR director responded in the comments below. All in all, I consider this a clear case of poorly handled PR job by FIBank. There is no point in discussing the rating downgrade itself; it was long due.

unnecessary
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Nov 21

Today an interesting BIS working paper (292) was released. Anyone remotely interested in economics is probably by now aware that central banks all over the world have gone to great lengths to loosen monetary policy, not only by lowering interest rate levels. Otherwise technical terms such as ‘quantitative easing’, ‘credit easing’, ‘bank reserves policy’ (bank reserves do play a very special role, see the article) are thus commonly circulated in popular media and have almost gone mainstream. While it may be a stretch to call these measures unconventional, the extensive usage at central banks of means other than the interest rate as the main transmission channel of monetary policy has prompted many observers to label those measures creative money printing. Now that is something far more captivating to the general public than the dorky ‘quantitative easing’.

This new paper from BIS tries to classify and appraise the unconventional measures under the broad term balance sheet policies in order to differentiate them from conventional interest rate policies. They define the decoupling principle as paramount for our understanding of that differentiation — i.e. they stipulate that size and structure of a central bank’s balance sheet is independent of the interest rate policy that the central bank pursues.

This is particularly important as central banks need not unwind their balance sheets immediately after changing their interest rate policy, should the economy begin to recover and zero interest rates need to be abandoned. Similarly, the authors hold that specific separate exit strategies for the unconventional measures are necessary. As long as central banks have the same tools at their disposal as they had when creating these measures they can execute differently timed, decoupled policy exits.

I think that we will indeed see significant political pressures towards delays in cutting back on balance sheet policies. This relates merely to the fact, as highlighted by BIS, that central banks have certainly lost much autonomy from their governments and they have essentially taken a variety of further financial risks, including credit, market, exchange etc. Conflicting interests between the central bank and the goverment are hence very plausible. E.g. the government would like to inflate away its increased debt (think of the U.S.), but the central bank might want to get a hold of inflation at the same time (as soon as this becomes an issue).

Exit strategies will need to be well communicated in terms of intent and desired effect, so that their purpose is properly understood by the market, to render them effective. Technically, quantitative easing measures could be easily withdrawn just as liquidity facilities could no longer be extended. Higher collateral haircuts could be applied, etc. This should keep in control potential inflationary issues (at least in the short run; the longer run is more problematic and is explained in the aforementioned article). That is, if hopefully western economies start recovering faster and accelerated credit extension starts taking place, central banks will have the tools to prevent disproportionate and inflationary increase in the actual money supply in the wider economy. As I’ve seen in my current line of work, the ECB has started to pull out some liquidity facilities and has began to filter out eligible collaretal for refinancing much more carefully.

In the end of the day, central banks have also learned plenty. They will try to steer clear out of new imbalances.

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Nov 18

I just came across The Economist’s debate on cloud computing. Stephen Elop, President of Microsoft’s Business Division and Marc Benioff, CEO of Salesforce outline their conflicting views on the future development of cloud computing. After a short scroll, I hold Benioff’s comments for clearly the more biased. I respect what Salesforce has achieved but Benioff’s views are still somewhat utopian. Elop on the other hand manages to deliver a much more realistic and less biased point of view. I am eager to see how Microsoft will realign or reshape their Azure strategy in general. I’m starting to think that some experts have prematurely underestimated Microsoft as the cloud losers.

All in all it’s great to follow these ongoing discussions. I’m especially interested in whether the outlooks I conceived in early 2009 (in my second bachelor’s thesis on cloud computing) will prove to be true in 1 or 2 years’ time. My personal opinion is that this technology is certainly not the “breakthrough” it is marketed to be. Rather, it’s a logical evolutionary step for virtualization combined with better utilization of existing computing capacities. Yet cloud services and cloud technology do make a lot of sense for a variety of business tasks and maybe even more technical tasks. But I guess I’m still skeptical because the cloud hype has to run its natural course first. Eventually, more mature solutions will settle in.

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