Dec 09

Emil A. Georgiev wrote a comment in my blog that I think entails a new post in reponse. He said:

I believe the Emirates will make it, but what do you think about Greece – a member of the Eurozone?

Yes, Greece’s budget deficit, rating downgrades and potential problems with their sovereign debt rollover are somewhat alarming. The problem is not that they do not have the money to repay that debt (of course they don’t) — the problem is that they are supposed to refinance themselves from the market. And as the market lends only to prudent borrowers, at a 12,6% deficit Greece may not be considered an eligible one.

Yet when it comes to a Western European, Eurozone country make no mistake — that debt will be underwritten no matter what. On the one hand, the effects of a potential Eurozone sovereign default will definitely be Lehman-like, i.e. the systemic relevance of that sovereign default is paramount. On the other hand, the surplus liquidity that the ECB seems to be slowly and deliberately retracting (e.g. their announcements on the ‘enhanced credit measures’ from last week) can and will be channeled elsewhere when needed. They do not even have to go great lengths to inflate away that debt.

In the end of the day, no one will allow a small and highly leveraged country of such systemic relevance to go under. Not only Greek’s government, but also the whole Euro currency union is only as good as its credibility. The rating agencies’ response and ultimately the higher cost of borrowing will have to be sadly borne by the whole Greek nation. Putting a higher price tag on future borrowing for the whole Greek economy out of rating/market necessity will act more disciplinary than any legal constraints Brussels might impose on Greece. After all, if they had been following the Eurozone 3% GDP deficit guidline figures, they wouldn’t be in the mess they are today. I do expect though that there will be significant pressure on Greece to cut its public spending, should the EU/ECB really step in to bail out the Hellenic Republic of Greece.

By the way, what this also re-translates to is that Bulgaria’s aspirations to ERM II could be put to a halt for the forseeable future. Joining the EU once is a good deed, but entering the monetary union now might actually go far beyond the official Maastricht criteria. Thus, even if we consider that in a semi-deflationary environment Bulgaria meets all three criteria with a balanced budget (close but under the 3% mark), low inflation (to be in the top 3 lowest EU-wide if I recall correctly; seems somewhat achievable now) and low public debt (Bulgaria’s is way below the maximum of 60% of GDP required), Bulgaria might still not make it to the Eurozone out of political and country risk reasons. Even without the infrastructure and social expenditures of Greece.

In a nutshell, Greece will not default. As the saying goes, if you do not repay a € 1.000,- debt you have a problem; if you do not replay a € 10 million debt, the bank has a problem. In this case this bank is the ECB and the responsible account manager is the EU. They will surely get a hold of the situation, yet the “little Dubai” effect and the bad aftertaste of a popped property price bubble will continue to linger not only on Bulgaria and Greece, but also on any country that leveraged itself mostly through property sales, rather than industrial output in the recent years (such as Spain).

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Dec 02

Ok here’s some good news. Yesterday Standard & Poor’s confirmed Bulgaria’s BBB foreign currency long term debt rating but upgraded its outlook to stable.

The measures taken by the government to cut expenses and increase revenues as well as next year’s budget were taken into account for the revision of the rating outlook. The government plans a budget deficit of 0,7% but many analysts seem to conclude that a deficit of 1,2-1,3% for 2010 is more realistic.

Parallel to the rating revisions, it’s interesting to follow the CDS on Buglaria’s sovereign debt. I just looked it up in my Bloomberg terminal at work and made a chart:

For anyone interested, below are the FC/LT debt ratings that S&P has assigned to the Republic of Bulgaria since 1998 (source: Bloomberg):

Rating Watch Date Effective
BBB 10/30/2008
BBB+ *- 10/23/2008
BBB+   10/26/2006
BBB   10/27/2005
BBB-   6/24/2004
BB+   5/22/2003
BB   10/ 7/2002
BB-   11/ 7/2001
B+   5/10/2000
B   11/23/1998
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Dec 02

After last week’s standstill — note to self: try to write at least one post per week. So here are 3 interesting topics that caught my attention last week. Hmm, that actually ain’t a bad idea — if nothing special comes up, I will try to write a weekly update on something plus “The BG Story”. The BG Story will come as an additional bonus for all my fellow Bulgarian friends that have started following my blog. Alright, here goes.

Dubai: will we see a double-dip fincancial crisis due to Dubai’s debt issues?

A valid question I suppose raised by many immediately after last week’s debt moratorium on Dubai World’s debt in regard to its subsidiary Nakheel. Nakheel is Dubai government’s real estate development vehicle that bravely invested in outrageously lavish projects such as the Palm Islands (a showcase of unnecessary land reclamation) and the Nakheel Tower — the would-be world’s tallest skyscraper, whose construction was already put on hold in January this year.

All in all, the proposed extension of maturity of the US-$ 59 billion worth of debt until May 2010 triggered luckily no massive, Lehman-II-style global sell off. I’d venture to guess a couple of reasons for that:

  • First and foremost, everyone should have been aware by now that Dubai’s construction boom and property bubble have come to a halt and a much needed reality check was due. The imminent correction due — decline of buyers and inevitable tightening of cashflow — is anything but a surprise for anyone invested in those real estate projects.
  • $59 billion is peanuts compared to the thousands of billions of real estate debt that the collective American household had accumulated for many years before the credit crunch eventually struck
  • The banks and Sovereign Wealth Funds of the Emirates should have enough cash on their hands (some sources quote a total for Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi of US-$ 1200 billion) to provide support for Dubai’s debt
  • Although Dubai’s government initial reaction was somewhat surprising, I think they did the right thing by not announcing that Nakheel’s debt will be underwritten right away. Why? Because, although later on Abu Dhabi’s central bank confirmed it would step up to help, they are setting a good example for prudent behavior to prevent future build up of bail-out candidates.

After reading a couple of articles I understand why analysts seem to conclude that Dubai’s debt issues will continue to cast a grim shadow on global markets until the end of the year and maybe beyond. However, in the end of the day I don’t think that will trigger anything Lehman-like.

Der Standard: Eastern Europe to see the slowest economic growth

Not surprisingly the press in Austria follows eagerly anything CEE/SEE related. In the past two weeks two alarming articles came up in Der Standard. EBRD’s chief economist Erik Berglöf estimated that the region will underperform significantly compared to the rest of the world in terms of economic growth.

In yet another Der Standard article Roland Berger’s CEE expert Vladimir Preveden holds that Eastern Europe will lose popularity as an economic destination. Some countries such as Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovenia and Slovakia  are likely to develop very differently “post-crisis” than region peers such as Hungary, Bulgaria or Romania. Structural reforms in those countries can only be brought about by either continious pressure from Brussels or by the IMF. Latvia’s standby agreement comes to mind.

In sum those countires are now at a sustainable strategic disadvantage. As Preveden points out, they also have very serious issues to deal with — accelerated ageing of the population together with steady brain drain and westward immigration.

The different, i.e. lower industrial profile of those countries renders them very dependent on foreign investments. Now, even though these are all risks that foreign investors were even pre-crisis well aware of, their “worst-case” scenario has certainly happened. The imbalances that were built after years of unsustainable growth, overinvestment in dubious short-term projects and relative underinvestment in local industrial development will continue to put pressure and dampen growth even after Western Europe recovers and beyond. Contrary to some SEE analyses that I read earlier this year, the common opinion now seems to be that SEE will not lead, but lag in terms of rebound growth.

The BG Story: FIBank downgraded by Moody’s, stops cooperation with them

Here’s an interesting official blog post in Capital.bg. FIBank’s response to being downgraded by Moody’s struck me as very “typical”, although breaking up with the agency might make good sense in their situation on cost grounds alone. I strongly agree with the way the blog article was written and I was not surprised at all by the way FIBank’s Marketing/PR director responded in the comments below. All in all, I consider this a clear case of poorly handled PR job by FIBank. There is no point in discussing the rating downgrade itself; it was long due.

unnecessary
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